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No one disputes that a male-female gender wage differential favoring men exists. 
This study seeks to unearth not only the sources ofthis differential but also the relative 
degrees to which the various sources impact the differential. The theories proposed by 
current literature suggest three principal causes: differences in human capital, crowding 
discrimination, and other forms ofdiscrimination. This study estimates separate 
equations for men and women and then uses the regression results to decompose the 
gender wage differential into the three aforementioned components. We find, after 
isolating the effects ofdifferences in individual human capital and choice characteristics 
as well as differences due to crowding, the residual surprisingly accounts for the largest 
proportion of the gender wage gap. Because the residual is so large, we believe that basic 
discrimination models must still be necessary and useful. Moreover, when one considers 
that the human capital differences that do exist may be reflecting feedback effects, the 
justification for combating societal stereotyping ofgender roles becomes even stronger, 
to promote not only equity but also efficiency in today's labor market. 
L 
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The feminist view ofwomen's situation comes to this: across time and space, 
there is too much variation in women's status, role, and treatment for it to be 
biological and too little variance for it to be individual. (MacKinnon 1987, 
25) 
INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that women have traditionally been segregated into certain types of 
jobs.- Only in the last few decades have women made great strides in both narrowing the pay 
gap within professions and increasing their numbers within traditionally male-dominated 
fields, such as medicine, law, business management and engineering. Recent studies confirm 
that both occupational segregation and pay differentials are declining (see Thomborrow and 
Sheldon 1995 or Blau, Ferber and Winkler 1998). Nonetheless, pay differentials between 
men and women remain substantial. 
There are two fundamental sets of explanations for the gender pay differential. The 
first set revolves around the basic human capital theory of labor. Ifone person earns lower 
wages than another person in the same job, the differential must be due to differences in the. 
two individuals' human capital, that is an individual's income-producing skill and 
knowledge. Individuals acquire human capital through investments in education, work 
experience, on-the-job training, and so on. However, even the most meticulous studies using 
differences in a large number ofproductivity-related characteristics have been unable to 
explain much more than halfof the differential. Thus, one is compelled to also consider 
discrimination theories. 
This paper seeks to explore causes of the gender wage gap. Ultimately, we break: the 
wage differential into three components: that due to individual human capital characteristics; 
that due to occupation, and specifically how female-dominated the individual's occupation is; 
and a residual, which we posit is largely comprised ofdiscrimination effects. Section II 
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provides the theoretical framework with seemingly opposing arguments, which we contend 
are not mutually exclusive. Section III delineates the empirical model and describes the data. 
Section IV discusses the regression results. Section V decomposes the regression results into 
the aforementioned three components. Section VI places the results in the context of policy 
issues. Finally, Section VII provides some concluding remarks. 
II. THEORY 
A. Human Capital Theory 
The supply-side explanation for gender differentials in economic outcomes revolves 
around the human capital theory of labor. Human capital theory focuses on the observation 
that men and women may come to the labor market with different tastes and with different 
qualifications, such as education, formal training, experience, and other productivity-related 
characteristics. Gender differences in tastes might mean, for example, that one group or the 
other has greater tolerance for an unpleasant, unhealthy, or dangerous environment; for 
longer work hours or inflexible work schedules; for physical strain; or for repetitive tasks. .f 
men are more willing to accept any or all of these conditions in return for higher wages, then 
such differences in tastes for different types of work could cause women to earn less and to 
be concentrated in different occupations. Moreover, if men come to the labor market with 
more education and work experience, they will be compensated with higher wages. 
In this context, the theory seemingly accounts for male-female earnings differentials 
vis-a-vis historical trends in human capital characteristics (see Goldin 1990 or Treiman and 
Hartmann 1981). For instance, women have historically been less likely to have completed 
college and gone on to postgraduate education. However, since trends in higher education 
reveal fast declining differences among younger cohorts, one would predict that differences 
3 
in educational attainment would not have as large an impact on the earnings differential as it 
might have in the past. 
A number of researchers (Mincer and Polachek 1974; Zellner 1975; Landes 1977) 
focus on women's "household responsibilities" as the chief explanation for lower earnings in 
female occupations and for women in general. Women expect only intermittent labor force 
participation. Hence, they will opt for jobs requiring less investment in human capital and/or 
jobs requiring skills that do not depreciate as much during periods of absence. Furthermore, 
human capital theory suggests that the weaker attachment to the labor force ofwomen 
following traditional roles means that they will acquire less ofthis valuable on-the-job 
training. Likewise, women may expend less energy on their market work simply because 
they put more effort into housework even when they are employed full time (Becker 1993). 
Available data indicate that, on average, women in the labor market have less work 
experience than men (Smith and Ward 1984). In 1984, for example, among employed 
workers aged 21 to 64, women averaged 5.2 years less labor market experience than men: 2.4 
fewer years with their current employer and 2.8 fewer years of prior work experience. 
Information on recent trends in work experience does suggest that gender differences may be 
narrowing (1967 and 1992 BLS report). However, the cultural trend remains that women are 
more likely to take time off from participation in the labor force, especially when they begin 
to have children. 
B. The Overcrowding Model 
Labor market discrimination occurs whenever men and women of equal productivity 
and aspirations are treated differently in hiring, retention, training, and promotion practices. 
Barbara Bergmann's model oflabor market overcrowding potentially captures most of these 
•
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effects (Bergmann 1974). Thus, Bergmann's model serves as a key part of the framework of 
this study. 
Bergmann argues that stereotypes and society's perceptions about what is "normal" 
actually divide labor markets into two separate labor markets--one for males and the other 
for females-in which the individuals are perfect substitutes. Society dictates that women 
should be caring and nurturing; thus, acceptable occupations for them emphasize these 
stereotypical female characteristics. As a result, women are crowded into these fields. One 
could argue that crowding could be due to different tastes and preferences between men and 
women. For women who would not choose these traditionally female occupations, though, 
crowding becomes a form ofdiscrimination. Bergmann's theory is summarized in Figure 1 
(Blau, Ferber and Winkler 1998, 2io). 
Figure 1. A Model ofLabor Market Overcrowding 
D(.f) 
oL(M) 
5cr:) W(f) 
o 
Suppose there is an undiscriminating market in which men and women earn the same 
average wage, wage woo With this as the starting point, now suppose that, for reasons described 
above, this market experiences discrimination and divides into a market for those discriminated 
against (t) and one for the preferred co-workers (m). Demand is no longer the same for men and 
women, giving an equilibrium wage Wo, but rather divides into DEMANDr and DEMAND•. 
• 
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Jobs in the separate market (m) are filled by a restricted supply oflabor (m) and wages for (m) 
increase. Also, members of(f) must "crowd" into a restricted number ofpositions if they want 
to remain in the market. As Figure 1 illustrates, pay differentials will develop whenever, relative 
to their respective supplies, DEMAND. is greater than DEMANDr• More females are 
"crowded" into a market that faces less demand, relative to the supply of labor in that market. 
Moreover, lower wages for females result from each individual being less productive because 
she has less capital with which to work. Consequently, those who remain in market (m) not only 
receive higher wages due to the laws ofsupply and demand, but they are also more productive 
because each has more capital to work with. Thus, both groups are paid according to their 
productivity. 
This is not to say that wage differentials do not exist in male-dominated occupations. In 
1995, women employed in professional occupations earned only 49.2 percent ofwhat men in 
professional occupations earned (Stanley and Danko 1996, 180). For example, female 
physicians earned only 52 percent ofwhat male physicians earned; female lawyers, 57.5 percent. 
However, traditional female occupations exhibit an overall discrimination effect due to the very 
fact that they are female dominated. In fact, studies done by Killingsworth (1990) and 
Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) found that both men and women earn less as an occupation 
becomes more "female." 
c. Becker's Discrimination Theory 
On the demand side, labor market discrimination exists when two equally qualified 
individuals are treated differently solely on the basis oftheir gender (Becker 1971). In the 
absence ofdiscrimination, profit-maximizing employers in a competitive labor market will pay 
workers in accordance with their productivity. However, if labor market discrimination exists, it 
is expected to adversely affect the economic status ofwomen by producing differences in pay 
between men and women that are not accounted for by differences in productivity-related 
•
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characteristics or qualifications. In some models, this inequality occurs because women are paid 
less than their marginal products due to discrimination. In other views of this process, labor 
market discrimination directly lowers women's productivity as well as their pay, as for instance, 
when a woman is denied access to an employer-sponsored training program or when customers 
are reluctant to patronize a female salesperson. 
There are many different forms of labor market discrimination. The most "true" and 
basic model is the "taste for discrimination" model. In the context ofgender, this model is based 
on the pure dislike of working with someone of the opposite sex. "Tastes" for discrimination can 
be on the part of employers themselves, fellow employees who refuse to work with someone of 
the opposite sex, or customers. The result of such "tastes" for discrimination are that employers, 
employees, and customers are willing to pay something either directly or in the form of a 
reduced income to be associated with some persons instead of others. Employers and customers 
perceive net wages and net prices as relatively higher because they are "paying" for undesirable 
associations with the discriminated-against person. Likewise, discriminating employees require 
higher net wages if they must work with the discriminated-against co-worker. 
On the other hand, it is possible that discrimination is not just the result ofdiscriminatory 
"tastes" or human capital choice. Rather, it may be the result of a market failure: imperfect 
information. The model ofstatistical discrimination assumes that employers and/or consumers 
face imperfect information and uncertainty regarding individuals' potential productivity (Blau, 
Ferber and Winkler, 176). As they make hiring or promotional decisions, employers project 
their "average" beliefs about a particular group onto an individual applicant who belongs to that 
particular group. As a result, individuals are discriminated against because the broader group to 
which they belong are believed all to share some undesirable, stereotypic characteristic. The 
result is that some qualified applicants are erroneously excluded from employment. 
• 
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In many cases, employers may believe that females do not have as high of an expected 
employment life as do their male counterparts and decide not to grant females the same 
opportunities of firm-specific training, job assignments, or promotion that they offer to males. 
For instance, a historical form of statistical discrimination has been against married women. 
Employers perceive that, on average, married women are more likely to withdraw from the labor 
force at some point than men are because they will want to have children. As a result of this 
trend, employers may be unsure as to the returns they will receive from training or promoting 
married women and therefore be less willing to do so. 
Unfortunately, this type ofdiscrimination is largely immeasurable and ultimately 
becomes an institutional factor, especially when one considers feedback effects. Feedback 
effects occur when productivity differences among workers reflect, in part, the decisions they 
make whether or not to invest in human capital. Anticipated labor market discrimination can 
affect women's economic status by lowering their incentives to continue their schooling, 
participate in a training program, remain continuously in the labor market, and so on. Quite 
rationally, many women doubt the marginal benefits of investing in themselves, especially if 
they believe it will not procure as great an economic reward than if they were men. Hence, 
gender differences in productivity-related characteristics may reflect not only the voluntary 
choices ofmen and women based on personal preference and social norms but also the indirect 
effects of labor market discrimination. 
ffi. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The data set used is the 1997 version ofthe National Longitudinal Survey ofYouth 
(NLSY), a cross-sectional database which interviews all individuals used in this study every year 
from 1979-1996, excluding 1995 for budget reasons. The individuals were between the ages of 
14-21 in 1979. This study uses 1996 data for all variables. The three-digit Census occupational 
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codes from the NLSY for the respondents' current occupations in 1996 were merged with data 
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found in the January 1997 edition Employment andEarnings on the percentage ofemployees 
who were females in each occupation for 1996. The result of merging these data is the PERCF 
variable, which represents the national percentage ofwomen in each individual's occupation. 
After removing all missing values, there were 2,966 men left in the study, and 2,698 women. 
The purpose of this study is to identify the causes of the gender wage gap. The theory 
suggests three principal components: individual productivity-related characteristics, differences 
in pay between "men's work" and "women's work" resulting from the crowding effect, and the 
residual, which Becker's theory posits is largely comprised of other discrimination effects 
beyond that ofcrowding. To obtain the estimates needed to perform the decomposition, we 
regress separate equations for men and women. Then, by plugging in the mean ofvalues of 
women into the male structural equation (or vice versa), one can ascertain what women's wages 
would be if they had the same reward structure (e.g., the same coefficients) as men (and vice 
versa). The decomposition is further explained in Section V. At this point, we estimate the 
regression equations as: 
(1)	 Wm= aom + alm(EDUm) + a2m(ONJOBEDUm) + a3m(MARDUMm) + 04m(WORKEXPm) + 
asm(KIDSINlllIm) + Oo6m(KIDSDUMm) + a7m(RACEm) + asm(HOURS96m) + a9m(pERCFm) 
(2)	 Wf= aof+ au(EDUf) + a2t{ONJOBEDUf) + a3t{MARDUMf) + <l4t{WORKEXPf) + 
aSt{KIDSINlllIf) + Oo6t{KIDSDUMf) + a7t{RACEr) + ast{HOURS96f) + a9t{PERCFf) 
Equation (1) represents the structure of the male pay system; equation (2) represents the 
structure of the female pay system. The advantage ofestimating separate equations for men and 
women is that we can observe whether any of the variables have opposite effects on men and 
women. Moreover, we have the advantage ofbeing able to see if the coefficients for each 
variable reveal structural differences in the variables' significance and size of impact on the 
genders' respective wages. Variable definitions and predicted signs are in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Predicted Signs 
Variable Predicted Sign, Women Predicted Sign, Men Definition 
1996 Income 
EDU 
ONJOBEDU 
WORKEXP 
-
HOURS96 
KIDSINHH 
KIDSDUM 
MARDUM 
PERCF 
RACE 
Dependent variable 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
-
-
-
+ 
Dependent variable 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
Annual wages and salary $s 
Highest grade completed 
Training provided on the job? 
Work experience index 
Hours worked in past year 
# of children in household 
Does he/she have children? 
Is he/she married? 
%female in occupation 
Is individual white? 
The model includes the traditional human capital variables: years of education (BDU) 
achieved by 1996, a dummy variable for whether the individual received on-the-job training or 
other educational experiences (ONJOBEDU), an index for prior work experience (WORKEXP), 
and the number ofhours the individual worked in 1996 (HOURS96). We had to construct an 
index for work experience because not every individual was interviewed each year. Instead of 
losing all those cases, which were coded as missing values, we compared the number of known 
years worked to the number ofknown years ofwork status. This index is explained in more 
detail in the Appendix. According to traditional theory, all of these human capital variables are 
expected to have positive coefficients for both men and women. 
Another vector ofvariables represents individual life choices which affect earnings, but 
are not exactly human capital variables. Theory suggests that these variables will have opposite 
effects on male and female earnings. For instance, a dummy variable for marital status--either 
married or not-is included. Based on historical norms, one might expect men's wages to 
increase after marriage, while women's will decrease. One might assume that single women 
10 
have more flexibility to pursue a professional career and career advancement. Since this norm is 
changing, though, we might find that women's wages do not drop when they get married. 
If indeed the regressions show that women's wages do still decrease upon marriage, this 
effect should be even stronger when children are present. As such, the model includes a dummy 
variable for whether or not children are present. According to theory and historical trends, 
women are more likely to be the primary caretakers of children. Moreover, a more dramatic 
effect will most likely occur after the first child is born, for the female will already either be at 
home or will have decreased her hours by the time subsequent children come along. 
Nonetheless, we might expect to find that women's wages will continue to drop with additional 
children; thus, a continuous variable for number of children is also included. With all of these 
"choice" variables, we expect the female coefficient to be negative. However, the expected sign 
for men is positive. Ifwomen are earning less when they get married and/or have children, to 
compensate for the female's foregone income, the men must earn more. 
Ofprinciple concern is how the measure of the concentration index (how female­
dominated the individual's occupation is) affects earnings. The PERCF variable represents the 
percentage of female workers in the individual's occupation in 1996, as defined by the three­
digit Census codes. The intent of this variable is to capture the discriminatory effects of 
crowding on female wages, as well as the effect on males who are in female-dominated 
occupations. According to Bergmann's crowding theory, the PERCF variable will be negative 
for both men and women. 
Finally, a dummy variable for race is also included to control for any racial 
discrimination. All of the aforementioned variables serve as explanatory variables for the 
dependent variable: individual wages and salary in the past calendar year (1996). Additional 
information on how the variables were extracted from the database and constructed is outlined in 
Appendix A. 
•
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To summarize, the hypotheses are: 
1.	 That the human capital variables (e.g., EDU, ONJOBEDU, WORKEXP, 
HOURS96) will all have positive coefficients for men and women. 
2.	 That the marital and family choice variables (e.g., KIDSINHH, KIDSDUM, 
MARDUM) will have negative coefficients for women, but positive 
coefficients for men. 
3.	 That the coefficient for the PERCF variable will be negative for both sexes. 
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS 
The separate equations for men and women were both estimated according to OLS 
regression. Table 2 summarizes the findings. The adjusted R-squared value for the male 
regression is .336; the female regression, .349. 
Table 2: Regression Results 
Men Women 
Independent Variable Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat 
(Constant) -52,723.18 -20.261"· -26,122.12 -11.941"· 
EDU 3,808.04 20.964"· 2,492.16 18.145·" 
ONJOBEDU 6,910.22 8.105"· 4,012.17 6.342"· 
WORKEXP 8.30 10.533"· 7.26 11.613"· 
HOURS96 6.39 12.895"· 5.13 13.723"· 
KIDSINlllI 599.15 1.111 516.35 1.362· 
KIDSDUM 1,911.38 1.260 -2,701.31 -2.630" 
MARDUM 3,422.24 3.122" 866.72 1.322· 
PERCF -55.97 -3.163" -98.80 -8.218"· 
RACE 2,789.75 3.321" 565.19 .903 
..·Results are significant beyond the .001 level. 
··Results are significant beyond the .01 level. 
·Results are significant at the .1 level. 
As expected, the control for race indicates that being white translates into higher wages. 
The proxies for education, hours worked in the past calendar year, work experience, and the 
dummy variable for whether or not education and training is available on the job-all of the 
• 
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strictly human capital variables-yielded highly significant, positive coefficients for both men 
and women. 
However, there are some notable differences in effect. For instance, the regression 
estimates that for each additional year ofeducation, men's wages will, on average, increase by 
$3,808.04. Yet, for women, each additional year only brings about an additional $2,492.16. 
Since the model controls for occupational choice, this result is highly interesting. This means 
that men are getting greater returns on their educational investments than women, ceteris 
paribus. This could be due to discrimination effects. In tum, ifwomen know the statistics and 
believe that educational training does not yield as great a return for them as it does for men, they 
may be less inclined to pursue higher education. This is one type of feedback effect. 
Differences in returns to human capital emerged for other variables as well. For an 
additional five hours worked each week, men made an additional $1,661.40, while women only 
earned an additional $1,333.80. For men who worked at ajob where training and education were 
provided, the benefit is an additional $6,910.22 a year. For women, however, that same benefit 
only yields an extra $4,012.17, on average. The last human capital variable is the proxy for 
work experience. As Table 2 reveals, once again, the same percentage increase in work 
experience yields a greater marginal effect for men than women. 
Perhaps the most interesting vector ofvariables is the individual choice variables. The 
most significant variable, both in terms of the T-statistic and the sheer magnitude of the 
coefficients, is the dummy for whether children are present in the home. As to be expected, the 
female equation suggests that earnings drop dramatically once that first child is born for women; 
however, the male equation suggests the opposite. Having children has a positive effect on 
men's wages. Though the effect from this dummy variable is highly significant for women, and 
not for men, the results are nonetheless both consequential and rational. Cultural tradition 
dictates that women be the primary domestic caretakers. It is true that these roles are becoming 
13 
•
 
less stringent over time; yet, the tradition persists, especially when children are present. 
Consequently, women oftentimes either reduce their hours or quit working altogether when that 
first child arrives. With the loss of this income, men must compensate for their lost income by 
earnmg more. 
Somewhat surprising is the positive coefficient attached to the continuous variable for 
how many children are in the household in the female equation. However, when one looks at the 
effect on the dummy variable for children combined with the continuous variable, the net effect 
on women's wages remains negative up to six children. One could interpret this to indicate that 
by the time a woman has six children, the older children are capable ofcaring for the younger 
children, thereby allowing the mother to work outside of the home. Moreover, it may be that the 
woman will have to work in order to provide for that many children, whether married or not. 
As for the marriage dummy variable, as previously discussed, historical norms would 
lead one to expect to find that getting married has a negative impact on women's wages. 
However, times are changing. Running the regressions in several different ways yielded a 
positive marriage coefficient every time for both men and women. Considering recent social 
changes, though, this effect makes sense. In the early decades of this century, it was against the 
law for married women to work. Not only have those laws been removed, but also, there is no 
longer the societal expectation that a woman will quit her job when she gets married. Ultimately, 
though, the net effect of the marriage dummy and the children variables is negative. 
Finally, as previous studies found and Bergmann's overcrowding model predicted, the 
PERCF variable has a negative impact on wages. The more female-dominated an occupation is, 
the less the average worker in that occupation will earn. As expected, this is true for both men 
and women. However, the negative effect is much greater for women, and much more 
significant. So, not only does "women's work" compensate with lower wages and salaries on 
average, but there are also continued wage differences within these female-dominated fields. 
14 
v. DECOMPOSITION 
The question now concerns the magnitude of the effects ofeach of these variables on the 
gender wage differential. In this section, we decompose the overall gap into three components­
human capital; the crowding effect, represented by PERCF; and a residual. We derived the basic 
model from a similar one used by Oaxaca (1973). However, this paper's decomposition serves 
as an extension of the original Oaxaca method. Since the purpose of the decomposition is to 
calculate percentages for each ofthe three causes, we include an extra step to measure the effects 
ofPERCF. 
There have been some criticisms of the Oaxaca approach. Brown et al (1980) argue that 
Oaxaca's method is unsatisfactory because he does not include occupational attainment in his 
equations and therefore the decomposition. Occupational attainment is indirectly built into our 
PERCF variable. Furthermore, Kidd and Shannon (1996) question the Brown approach insofar 
that their occupational classifications are too broad. Kidd and Shannon narrow the 
classifications and prove that the conclusions are more valid by doing so. Thus, this paper uses 
the narrowest Census occupational codes available. 
The following subsections derive the proportion of the total wage differential explained 
by each of the three components. One can easily calculate the real-world wage differential from 
the descriptive statistics in Table 3. We denote the actual male-female wage differential as the 
average male wage ($32,200.40) minus the average female wage ($21,135.69). Thus, the gap 
between average male wages and average female wages is $11,064.71. It is this gap that the 
subsequent sections aim to explain. 
• 
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Table 3: Cross-sectional Descriptive Statistics from the Data 
Men 
Mean 
$32,200.40 
Std. Dev. 
$26,550.42 
Wo
Mean 
$21,135.69 
men 
Std. Dev. 
$19,247.271996 Income 
Education level 13.10 2.49 13.37 2.34 
On the job training? .48 .50 .53 .50 
Work experience index 1650.74 562.66 1296.09 551.51 
Hours worked in 1996 
-
2251.95 866.19 1821.53 868.34 
# ofchildren in household 1.18 1.28 1.53 1.22 
Ifhave kids at all (dummy) .56 .50 .75 .44 
Married? (dummy) .58 .50 .55 .50 
% female in occupation 28.32 23.89 65.55 25.02 
Race (dummy) .54 .50 .51 .50 
Our overall goal is to explain the overall wage gap (Wm - Wr), as it is equal to the sum of 
the three separate components: 
(3) 100% of(Wm - Wr) = % due to IC differences + % due to crowding + residual 
A. Percentage due to Differences in Individual Characteristics (IC) 
The equations used to isolate the effects due to differences in individual characteristics 
are the following: 
(4) Wm= am + PmICm + omPERCFm= $32,200.40 
(5) Wr= ar+ PrICr+ OtPERCFr= $21,235.69 
Equation 4 and equation 5 are simply condensed versions of the original male and female 
structural equations (1 and 2). The vector ofvariables represented by IC includes all of the 
estimated individual characteristics, including human capital variables (EDU, ONJOBEDU, 
WORKEXP, HOURS96), life choice variables (KIDSINHH, KIDSDUM, MARDUM), and race. 
-16 
Equation 4 represents the male estimated variables; equation 5, the female estimated variables. 
The following equation then represents what women's wages would be if they were rewarded the 
same as men for their investments in human capital: 
(6) W/ = am + ~mICr+ BmPERCFm= $28,290.43 
Subtracting equation 6 from equation 4, we obtain equation 7: 
(4) Wm= am + ~mICm + BmPERCFm= $32,200.40 
(6) :wr~ICf+ BmPERCFm = $28,290.43 
(7) = $3,909.97 = 35.34% of the wage differential 
Thus, 35.34% ofthe overall gender wage gap is due to differences in individual 
characteristics, including human capital endowments and life choices regarding marriage and 
children. The following equation represents the remaining factors: 
(8) (W/ - Wr) = (am - ar) + (~m - ~r)ICr+ (BmPERCFm- BtPERCFr) = $7,154.74 = 64.66% 
This equation represents the effects due to different reward structures to human capital as 
well as differences in the average percentage of females in the individual's occupation (PERCF). 
B. Crowding Effect (PERCF) 
We now need to decompose the remaining differential (64.66%) into that due to 
crowding discrimination and a residual. To isolate the effects ofcrowding, we simply look at the 
difference between women's wages given the male PERCF average (28.32%), represented by 
W/, and wages given the female PERCF average (65.55%), which we code as wt: 
(9) W(* = am + ~mICr+ BmPERCFr= $26,206.66 
Notice that the only difference between W/ and wt is this change in the PERCF variable in the 
regression equation from 28.32% to 65.55%. To isolate the effects of crowding, we take the 
difference between W( and W(*: 
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® W/ = a.m+ ~mICr+ omPERCFm= $28,290.43 
(9) wt* = a.m..±AnICr + OmPERCFr = $26.206.66 
(10) (Wt -wt*) = om(pERCFm- PERCFr) = $2,083.77 = 18.83% of the wage gap 
The resulting proportion due to crowding effects is 18.83 percent. 
c. The Residual 
The remaining proportion-that is, the part of the differential that cannot be explained by 
differences in human capital variables or crowding-is the residual. We can compile the 
separate components to derive an overall equation and solve for the residual. Combining 
Equation (5) and Equation (6), we find that the overall gender wage gap equals: 
(11)	 (Wm - W/) + (W/ - wt) + Residual 100% 
(Wm- Wr) 
More simply, we can use our answers in the above sections to compute the residual effect. 
Rearranging Equation (3), we obtain: 
(12) 100% - % due to IC - % due to crowding = residual 
The result is: 
(12)	 100% - (35.34% + 18.83%) = 45.83% 
Thus, 45.83 percent of the overall gender wage gap is unaccounted for. Mathematically, 
the residual represents that portion of the wage differential due to differences in coeflicients­
that is, differences in reward structures for men and women. The residual could include possible 
effects due to omitted human capital variables, extenuating circumstances which are not easily 
measurable, and imperfectly measured variables in the regression. For instance, the residual 
could be catching effects due to crowding found within a broader classification ofoccupations. 
However, the residual is too large to dismiss as the effects oferrors. Becker would argue that the 
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large residual is reflecting pure "tastes" for discrimination. Given the fact that previous 
proportions have already accounted for not only human capital differences but also life choices, 
including marriage, children, and occupational choice, pure discrimination is very likely a 
significant factor in the residual and thus in the gender wage gap. 
Overall, the decomposition reveals that all three components are important. Differences 
in individual characteristics comprise a substantial component of the gender wage differential. 
However, this proportion is surprisingly small considering that more than just human capital 
variables are included. Furthermore, we cannot measure the extent to which human capital 
differences reflect choice, tradition, or barriers to obtaining human capital itself Secondly, 
crowding, a form ofdiscrimination, accounts for a substantial portion of the gender wage 
differential. Finally, the surprisingly large residual strongly supports the assertion that Becker's 
traditional discrimination theories still apply to today' s labor market, for the most likely 
explanation for a large residual is continuing demand-side discrimination. 
Appendix B enumerates the results if the decomposition had been carried out using male 
means and the female structural equation. 
VL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
One can justify government policies to confront and abate labor market discrimination 
against women on two grounds. The first is equity, or fairness. The second is that unequal 
treatment may result in an inefficient allocation of resources. When equally productive men and 
women are hired for different jobs, and women's jobs on average pay less, then prices are not 
serving as accurate indicators of social costs. The crowding effect causes society to produce too 
much of the outputs that uses "underpriced" female labor since the contribution ofequally 
productive labor is valued more highly in the male sector. In tum, such overproduction leads to 
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a simple supply and demand dilemma for female labor: supply exceeds demand and price falls 
even further. 
As Edward Potter and Judith Youngman asserted in their important book on how to keep 
the US competitive as the next century approaches, "America's competitiveness suffers when 
skilled workers from any segment... are excluded arbitrarily from employment opportunities or 
prevented from working up to full potential because of discriminatory employment practices, 
hostile workplace environment, or unnecessary inflexible employment policies" (1995, 342). 
Employers who expect to be competitive cannot afford to overlook necessary skills and 
experience merely because of race, gender, or ethnic background. In this regard, the principles 
underlying efforts to attract a diverse work force are closely related to principles underlying our 
equal employment opportunity laws. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the federal agency charged 
with enforcing the Equal Pay Act (1963) and Title VII (1964), both ofwhich prohibit various 
types ofdiscrimination against women on the firm level. Other laws protect "women's rights" in 
specific categories. Unfortunately, the Equal Pay Act has relatively little real impact, mostly 
because it only requires equal pay for "equal" work. In reality, men and women rarely do the 
same kind ofwork in the same firm. 
Nonetheless, this study has found that discrimination (in the form of crowding) persists as 
a key component of the gender wage differential. Therefore, anti-discrimination policies are still 
necessary, in some form. Because the civil rights agencies can promote work force diversity and 
equity by effectively enforcing existing nondiscrimination laws and affirmative action 
requirements, the prudent course of action seems to be to clarify and streamline the existing laws 
and regulations. 
Perhaps the most serious challenge that today' s federal policymakers face in the area of 
equal employment opportunity and affirmative action is not the requirements themselves but 
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rather, how these policies are perceived. Many people even debate just who the "victims" of 
many ofthese government policies are. The most hotly debated program continues to be 
Affirmative Action. For example, when a woman or a minority attains a position, observers may 
leap to the conclusion that the individual is an "affirmative action hire," which mayor may not 
be true. Those who did not receive the job may feel that it was "because" ofaffirmative action. 
A second reason for the upsurge in public opinion against this policy in the last few years is that, 
in times ofan uncertain labor market such as we experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
affirmative action becomes an easy scapegoat. 
Unfortunately, ifwomen believe they are obtaining jobs only to fill a company's quota, 
this lowers their self-confidence and thus their productivity, culminating in a vicious cycle. 
However, ifwe can educate the public to believe that government policies are needed not only to 
"equalize" the fairness ofthe labor market, but also to provide a more efficient allocation of 
resources, then people may be less willing to flippantly use affrrmative action as a scapegoat. In 
tum, this could have a positive feedback effect (for once!), boosting women's confidence that 
they were hired because they were qualified and thereby enable them to be more effective on 
their jobs. 
Moreover, beyond the equity issues, efficiency arguments also work in favor of 
improving the image of equal opportunity employment laws. It has become all too common to 
characterize EED and affirmative action as concepts that have no connection to the company's 
bottom line. To some extent, the enforcement agencies and their inability to communicate to the 
public the relationship between a productive workplace and nondiscriminatory selection 
decisions are to blame for this negative perception. Therefore, the ultimate task ofpolicymakers 
is to understand the common threads that connect BED and affirmative action requirements to 
good business practices so that they can then begin to improve the tarnished image of affirmative 
action. 
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VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study has searched for an explanation for the gender wage differential and found that 
the residual surprisingly accounts for the majority of the gap. Though the effects of crowding 
discrimination and differences due to individual characteristics also carry considerable influence, 
there can be little doubt that labor market discrimination against women persists. Moreover, we 
may never know the (large and largely immeasurable) extent to which feedback effects influence 
women's decisions to obtain higher education, work longer hours, or pursue traditionally male­
dominated jobs. 
Once a woman decides to invest in education, though, and enter the occupation of her 
choice, Equal Opportunity Employment laws can still playa beneficial role in human resource 
practices. Such laws will always have a role as long as discrimination persists. The key, though, 
is to continue the societal advances which are finally beginning to tell women that it is okay to be 
a doctor, a lawyer, a CEO or an engineer. The more confident women are in their abilities, the 
greater the positive feedback effects, the more productive they will be, the more they will be able 
to combat societal discrimination, and hopefully, the more the gender wage differential will 
continue to decline. 
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Appendix A
 
The Data Base and Adjustments of the Raw Values 
As mentioned in the text, the data base used in this study is the National Longitudinal 
Survey ofYouth (NLSY). The data set begins in 1979, when the respondents were between the 
ages_of 14-21. Since then, the interviewers have updated and added questions each year, 
excluding 1995. The 1997 edition, which is the one used in this paper, interviews through the 
year 1996. The following explanation reviews how the variables were extracted, sorted, and 
constructed. 
The dependent variable is fairly straightforward. The actual variable extracted from the 
database was "total income from wages and salary in the past calendar year," the past calendar 
year being 1996 for this study. All the missing values, coded as either -5 or -4, were 
eliminated-not by hand, but rather via an SPSS command. These figures are denominated in 
dollars. 
The education variable extracted was "highest grade completed." It records grade levels 
directly; 16 years equals an undergraduate education; 18, a masters; more than 18, an advanced 
degree. Once again, 1996 answers were used and missing values were eliminated. 
"Hours worked in the past calendar year" (1996) is also a straightforward variable. It is a 
constructed variable within the database itself, already annualized from the question asked 
regarding number ofhours worked per week. 
The on-the-job training variable is a dummy variable both in the NLSY and in this study. 
An answer of 1 indicates that the respondent does receive training on the job; of0, that he or she 
does not. There were no manipulations done to this variable. 
The WORKEXP variable is a constructed variable for this study. I extracted the number 
ofhours worked in each year from 1979-1995, inclusive. However, because of missing values or 
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non-interviews in some years, I had to construct an index. Thus, the index equals the total 
number of hours worked in years accounted for divided by the number of years accounted for. 
The "kids in household" was taken directly from the database. The dummy variable for 
children was constructed from the "kids in household" variable by recoding: 0 represents no 
children in the household; 1 equals children. The marriage variable was recoded in a similar 
fashion: 0 represents a single, widowed or divorced respondent; 1 represents a married 
respondent. 
The race variable was also recoded. In the database, race is coded as such: 1 signifies 
Hispanic origin; 2 represents African-Americans; and 3 represents non-Hispanic or non-black. I 
translated the latter to mean white, though it could very well mean other classifications, such as 
Asian. I recoded the variables into just 2 values: 0 to equal minority (black or Hispanic) and 1 
to signify non-minority. 
Finally, the most interesting variable to construct was PERCF. The NLSY records 
respondents' occupations according to 1980 Census codes. I then merged these codes with the 
female percentages for each occupational listing found in Employment and Earnings (January 
1997, pp. 171-76). I entered these values by hand onto the spreadsheet. The 8.0 version of SPSS 
provided the spreadsheet for all the regressions and decomposition calculations. 
• 
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Appendix B
 
Reverse Decomposition, using the female structural equation 
Initially, we used the male structural equation to carry out the decomposition because it 
made more sense conceptually. Interestingly, when we carried out the decomposition using the 
fem,!le equation instead of the male structural equation, we reached the same basic conclusions. 
All three components still accounted for significant portions of the gender wage gap. 
The effect due to differences in individual characteristics is so near to the outcome from 
the method using the male structural equation, that any divergence is virtually negligible. The 
most significant difference in this "reverse decomposition" is that the percentage of the wage gap 
due to crowding nearly doubled, due to the significantly smaller coefficient for women regarding 
the PERCF variable. Therefore, the residual decreases by the same percentage points that the 
crowding effect increases. The following delineates the steps taken in this "reverse 
decomposition" and the resulting percentage effects attributed to each of the three components: 
Step #1: For the reverse decomposition, we use the female equation: 
(2)	 Wf= Uof+ O,u(EDUf) + 0'2t{ONJOBEDUf) + 0'3t{MARDUMf) + <X.4t{WORKEXPf) + 
O,St{KIDSINlllIf) + <l6t{KIDSDUMf) + o'7f(RACEr) + O,st{HOURS96f) + 0'9t{PERCFf) 
Step #2: Look at descriptives and simulate wages: 
variable fem coeff fem mean male W(m)* W(m)** 
mean 
constant -26122.12 -26122.12 
EDU 2492.16 13.37 13.10 32647.30 32647.30 
ONJOBEDU 4012.17 0.53 0.48 1925.84 1925.84 
WORKEXP 7.26 1296.09 1650.74 11984.37 11984.37 
HOURS96 5.13 1821.53 2251.95 11552.50 11552.50 
KIDSINHH 516.35 1.53 1.18 609.29 609.29 
KIDSDUM -2701.31 0.75 0.56 -1512.73 -1512.73 
RACE 565.19 0.51 0.54 305.20 305.20 
MARDUM 866.72 0.55 0.58 502.70 502.70 
PERCF -98.80 65.55 28.32 -6476.34 -2798.02 
25416.01 29094.34 
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Step #3: Summarize equations 
Wm = am + r3mICm+ 8mPERCFm= $32,200.40 
Wr = ur + r3tICr + OtPERCFr = $21,135.69 
Wm* =Ur + r3tICm + 8tPERCFr =$25,416.01 
Wm** = ur + r3tICm + 8tPERCFm = $29,094.34 
% due to differences in individual characteristics 
&..i~ x 100 = 38.68% 
(yir- Wm) 
Step #4: % due to Crowding Discrimination 
f.YIm* -Wrr::.J x 100 = 33.24% 
(yir- Wm) 
Step #5: Residual 
(W'!1" - Wr) x 100 = 38.08% 
(yir- Wm) 
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